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Abstract Contemporary brain reading technologies promise to provide the pos-
sibility to decode and interpret mental states and processes. Brain reading could 
have numerous societally relevant implications. In particular, the private character 
of mind might be affected, generating ethical and legal concerns. This paper aims 
at equipping ethicists and policy makers with conceptual tools to support an evalu-
ation of the potential applicability and the implications of current and near future 
brain reading technology. We start with clarifying the concepts of mind reading and 
brain reading, and the different kinds of mental states that could in principle be read. 
Subsequently, we devise an evaluative framework that is composed of five criteria-
accuracy, reliability, informativity, concealability and enforceability-aimed at ena-
bling a clearer estimation of the degree to which brain reading might be realistically 
deployed in contexts where mental privacy could be at stake. While accuracy and 
reliability capture how well a certain method can access mental content, informativ-
ity indicates the relevance the obtainable data have for practical purposes. Conceal-
ability and enforceability are particularly important for the evaluation of concerns 
about potential violations of mental privacy and civil rights. The former concerns 
the degree with which a brain reading method can be concealed from an individual’s 
perception or awareness. The latter regards the extent to which a method can be used 
against somebody’s will. With the help of these criteria, stakeholders can orient 
themselves in the rapidly developing field of brain reading.
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Introduction
Mind reading is as old as social interaction. In daily life, we are constantly trying 
to understand the beliefs, desires, intentions, feelings and capacities of other agents 
(either human or animal). Traditionally, informal observation of an agent’s behavior 
(including language production) provided the sole basis for the ascription of mental 
states. In the last century, such an informal approach has been gradually comple-
mented, and sometimes replaced, by systematic psychological observation and test-
ing. These methods were introduced and commonly employed to assess an individ-
ual’s mental health, or potential for education and career (Gross 1962). Over the last 
decades, brain measurements have become a further source of information. They can 
be used to diagnose pathologies, develop cognitive theories, drive software or hard-
ware devices, or infer the occurrence and nature of certain mental states. The act of 
making inferences regarding the occurrence and nature of mental states has recently 
been referred to as ‘brain reading’ (Haynes 2012): the observation of brain structure 
and/or activity aimed at obtaining insights about mental states.1 In the remainder of 
this paper, we will speak of ‘brain reading’ to refer to the use of brain measurements 
for the purpose of mind reading, in distinction from other forms of mind reading 
(such as behavioral observation). So, whereas mind reading is the attempt to under-
stand mental states, brain reading is the attempt to mind read solely on the basis of 
brain measurements. This additional possibility might have significant implications 
for the private character of the mind, at least in principle challenging the widely 
shared intuition that our mental states can be secluded. Ayer (1963, chapter 3) distin-
guished at least four ways in which our mental states can be said to be private.2 First, 
they are private in the sense that they can be incommunicable. People can experi-
ence insurmountable difficulties in adequately expressing their thoughts or feelings. 
There is, or there can be, a felt difference between the report and the experience of 
what is reported. Second, mental states are private in the sense that individuals have 
a ‘first person perspective’ (Shoemaker 1988, 1994) on their inner mental life. Each 
person only has such ‘special access’ to his or her own mental states. One knows 
introspectively about one’s own mental states, which is different from the way any-
one else can know about them. In other words, there is a qualitative component that 
is inaccessible to an external viewer. Third, mental states are private in the sense 
that they can be unshareable, meaning that it is impossible for two persons to enter-
tain exactly the same thought in exactly the same way. Fourth, mental states are pri-
vate in the sense they can be incorrigible, for certain knowledge claims cannot be 
1 We will for now neglect the distinction between mental states and mental traits, and include both under 
the first term. We will return later in the text to make this distinction explicit.
2 These features were also discussed by Rorty (1970) when he considered whether they could be taken 
as special features (‘marks’) of the mental.
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corrected or overridden. There seems to be no way to categorically deny subjective 
reports of thoughts and sensations. “That’s how I feel it” is a statement that, in many 
cases, invokes an unassailable authority regarding one’s own mental life.
Brain reading’s potential implications for mental privacy have recently cap-
tured the interest of both the popular (Roth 2009; Sample 2012; Wolpe 2009) and 
the scientific press (Farah et al. 2009; Haynes 2012; Shen 2013), generating hype 
and expectations (hopes as well as fears) in society. On the one hand, brain reading 
technology might lead to a number of clinical and scientific advances regarding the 
nature of mental states and their neural representations.
On the other hand, however, it could generate a number of ethical concerns, 
from the potential use and abuse of collected personal data (Ienca and Haselager 
2016) to Orwellian scenarios where peoples’ liberties are at stake and minds can be 
coercively or covertly monitored (Federspiel 2007). For instance, as Shen reports, 
one of the questions that is commonly discussed in newspapers and mass media is 
whether ‘brain science [will] be used by the government to access the most private 
of spaces—our minds—against our wills’ (Shen 2013, p. 654). It is not difficult to 
imagine how the possibility to extract thoughts from the brain without appealing to 
behavioral cues can be unsettling. Mental privacy infringement has been discussed 
earlier in relation to psychological profiling and polygraph testing (Black 1994; Her-
mann 1971). Those techniques aim at mind reading without directly accessing brain 
functioning. Contemporary technologies that monitor brain activity constitute a sig-
nificant addition to those indirect techniques in that they can establish an explicit 
relationship between psychological processes and the underlying neural events. If 
one accepts the assumption that every mental state must be implemented by some 
neural mechanism, then the observation of the causal machinery underlying thought 
and feeling may be considered by some to be a good or even compelling reason 
to override the traditionally decisive first-person reports. This could be further 
strengthened by the potentially superior performance of brain reading methods over 
classic investigation techniques. In addition, direct observation of the brain could 
lead, at least in principle, to access a significantly vaster or more detailed array of 
mental states.
However, it is far from clear that the unsettling consequences sketched in the 
media may actually take place within a reasonable time frame. The technical and 
theoretical challenges for brain reading are considerable. Indeed, it is not difficult 
to find contrasting claims regarding the achievements of brain reading within the 
same paper (Haynes 2012). That said, it is also important to discuss potential impli-
cations of a technology that is still in its infancy, if only to avoid committing a—
well-known to the ethics of technology—delay fallacy (van de Poel and Royakkers 
2011). Ideally, discussions about the potential implications of brain reading should 
take place in parallel with, and not after, the development of the technology. There-
fore, this paper aims at equipping ethicists and policy makers with conceptual tools 
to support an evaluation of the potential applicability and the implications of current 
(as of 2018) and near future (approximately 5–10 years, based on currently ongo-
ing research) brain reading technology. We devise an evaluative framework that is 
composed of five criteria—accuracy, reliability, informativity, concealability and 
enforceability—aimed at enabling a clearer estimation of the degree to which a 
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certain technology could be applied in contexts where mental privacy could be at 
stake. In particular, our conceptual framework aims at facilitating judgments on: (1) 
the applications where brain-reading could be more reliably used (e.g. which states 
of mind can be more easily investigated); (2) the different contexts where it could 
be applied (e.g. in court cases or for job assessments); (3) the possible time frame 
within which different applications could be expected (focusing on now or in the 
near future); (4) the degree to which these applications could pose a threat to men-
tal privacy. The five criteria of the evaluative framework we propose can be effec-
tively employed by stakeholders such as ethicists, legal experts and policy makers, 
who require instruments to aid practical ethical reasoning and decision making, or to 
systematize and clarify their questions regarding a developing neurotechnology. A 
proper understanding of brain reading methods, their potential and their limits, max-
imizes the chances to timely assess and address emerging ethical, legal and societal 
implications.
Brain Measurements, Mind Reading and Brain Reading
In this section, we aim to explain some of the basics about brain reading methods 
and technologies3 and provide a clear terminology to talk about them. In order to 
understand what brain reading is, we should start from the more general category 
of ‘brain measuring’.4 With that term, we describe any process or technology aimed 
at obtaining information about the brain and/or its functioning, from direct observa-
tion (e.g. autopsies or exploratory surgery), to modern imaging technologies (e.g. 
magnetic resonance imaging, positron emission tomography…). Brain measure-
ments are useful in at least four domains of application. The first one is the produc-
tion of physiological and pathological models and theories. This is of importance 
to address clinical cases and advance medical knowledge. A second domain where 
brain measurements can play a role is the development of cognitive theories. Cog-
nition could in principle be studied independently from the specific structures that 
realize it, be it a brain, a chip, or whatnot. However, observing how the brain works 
can contribute to inform and/or constrain cognitive theories. Information about the 
brain can provide inspiration for producing biologically plausible cognitive models. 
A third domain where brain measurements are central is Brain–Computer Interfac-
ing. Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs) are technologies aimed at “utilizing” brain 
signals to command a software or hardware device (e.g. to control the movement 
3 The words ‘method’ and ‘technology’ are not synonymous. Where a method is properly a comprehen-
sive set of procedures or techniques and the connected theoretical knowledge, the word ‘technology’ puts 
a stronger accent to the material device that makes a certain task possible. However, we decided for sim-
plicity’s sake to use the two terms interchangeably.
4 It is important to note that the concept of brain reading has been used in the literature with different 
degrees of generality. For instance, where Shen (2013) uses it in a more liberal fashion to include any 
form of brain measurement, Haynes (2012) tends to equal it to the concept of brain decoding. Since we 
aim at conceptual clarification, we will use ‘brain measurement’ for the most general version and ‘brain 
reading’ only for those applications aimed at decoding (classifying and interpreting) mental states.
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of a cursor on a computer screen). Additionally, those brain signals can be used to 
provide “neurofeedback”. A user can visualize her own ongoing brain activity in 
order to learn self-regulation of brain functions or be warned about imminent unde-
sired neural events, e.g. epileptic seizures. In BCI a machine learning algorithm rec-
ognizes and categorizes, an arbitrary, preferably easy to evoke and measure, neural 
activity pattern. The particular kind or nature of the mental state that is correlated to 
such activity need not be relevant as long as it can be used to reliably drive a system5 
or provide a user with a certain feedback. Finally, brain measurements can be used 
as brain reading: a brain measurement aimed at mind reading. Brain reading, though 
sharing numerous techniques with BCI, differs from it in its main scope. Rather than 
utilizing brain markers as inputs for a device, brain reading aims at understanding 
the way mental states are represented in the brain. That is, brain measurements are 
used to decode or interpret mental states (assess their nature and/or content). As 
suggested by the very word ‘reading’, brain reading is based on interpreting (com-
binations of) neuronal signs and drawing inferences about their meaning. As indi-
cated, traditional mind reading activity relies on behavioral observation and infer-
ential processes. Brain reading technology allows one to replace the observation of 
behavior with measurements of the brain structure and/or activity. Assuming a cor-
relation between brain structure and functions and mental states, the latter can be 
inferred from the observation of the former.
In this paper, we use the concept of ‘mental state’ in a rather broad fashion to 
encompass every aspect of an individual’s psychology, including, but not limited 
to, personality traits and dispositions (e.g. sexual preferences, personal tastes and 
habits…), qualitative states (e.g. perceptions, emotions, feelings…), propositional 
states (e.g. knowledge, beliefs), intentions and goals, plans, memories etc. However, 
we should keep an important distinction in mind. On the one hand, we have traits 
that are relatively permanent dispositional psychological qualities, characteristics of 
individuals. On the other hand, we have occurrent mental states, the states that are 
entertained or experienced by a subject at a particular moment in time. Psychologi-
cal traits enable and dispose a subject towards entertaining a certain occurrent men-
tal state. For instance, having a high degree of trait anxiety makes a subject more 
vulnerable to experiencing anxiety in a variety of contexts and situations. Traits are 
also conceivable as capacities or enabling conditions. For instance, having a cer-
tain degree of self-control is a trait that makes a subject capable of displaying self-
control in certain situations where other subjects might be unable to. Below, we will 
talk about mental states in general to refer to both traits and occurrent states, unless 
otherwise specified (Fig. 1).
A further important distinction is that between apparent and non-apparent men-
tal states: apparent mental states are those that can be identified by mere external 
observation of behavior, thanks to normal human mind reading capacities, e.g. by 
seeing trembling hands inferring that someone is nervous. Non-apparent mental 
5 BCI can also be said to entail implications for mental privacy (Ienca and Haselager 2016; Klein 2016). 
However, strictly speaking, working with BCIs in itself need not require one to interpret the brain signals 
in terms of mental states.
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states, instead, are concealed from external observation. Furthermore, different tech-
nologies have been developed to identify both apparent and non-apparent mental 
states without appealing to human mind reading capacities. Identification of appar-
ent mental states can for instance be automatized by using deep learning techniques 
for feature recognition (Güçlütürk et al. 2016), achieving performances that can get 
close to, or become better than, human ones. Applied to brain reading, such methods 
offer, at least in principle, an additional window on apparent mental states, poten-
tially more penetrating than introspection or external observation. Brain reading 
methods can also offer distinctive insight into non-apparent mental states and this 
could make those methods particularly relevant from e.g. a clinical perspective [e.g. 
assisting psychotherapy by providing a better understanding of a patient’s psycho-
logical complexities (Habes et al. 2013)], but also more compelling from an ethical, 
legal and societal perspective. Existing methods, such as the polygraph (Vicianova 
2015), infrared thermal imaging (Park et al. 2013) and voice stress analysis (Ruiz 
et  al. 1990), sport principled limits when compared to brain reading technology. 
They typically only allow the detection of a generic physiological alteration, com-
monly associated—to different extents—with particularly compelling emotional 
states. Technologies that directly record neural dynamics could provide significantly 
more detailed information about one’s apparent and non-apparent states of mind.
Different mental states can be assessed with different brain reading methods. In 
assessing traits, brain measurements can reveal to a certain extent the presence -or 
the probability thereof- of certain features that characterize or underlie the attrib-
utes or behavioral dispositions of a person (Ma et  al. 2014), such as intelligence 
(Malpas et  al. 2016), self-control (Krämer and Gruber 2015; Maier et  al. 2015), 
sexual orientation (Habermeyer et al. 2013; Poeppl et al. 2015; Ponseti 2012) etc. 
This can be done either by checking for certain brain anatomical features (through 
Fig. 1  Different applications of brain measurement
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either neurobiological analysis or by the means of structural imaging technologies), 
or by identifying characteristic patterns of neural activation that can be associated 
to certain traits. An organic anomaly, a tumor, a stroke, or just a particular feature 
of the cerebral tissue (such as e.g. the amount of white matter in a particular neu-
ral pathway), might contribute to inferring an individual’s (in)capacity to display 
a certain behavior, e.g. to maintain a conduct that is considered to be normal. For 
instance, Motzkin et al. (2011) suggest that “psychopathy is associated with reduced 
structural integrity in the right uncinated fasciculus”. In healthy brains, structural 
and neurobiological markers such as density or connectivity of the neural tissue in 
certain areas, could be found to predict the presence of certain cognitive traits (Ber-
nardi et al. 2014) [similar processes have been famously applied in genetics (Fara-
hany 2016; Illes and Racine 2005; Rigoni et  al. 2010)]. Whereas traits can be in 
principle found out to be connected to both structural or functional neural features, 
occurrent mental states are always connected to brain activity itself. Those states are 
defined as temporary functional states of the brain, and are often identified through 
functional neuroimaging technology that allows one to monitor, classify and inter-
pret the neural activity. So far, different functional methods have been applied to the 
investigation of numerous mental states such as, but not limited to, intentions (Bode 
et al. 2012, 2013; Haynes et al. 2007; Soon et al. 2008, 2013), visual perceptions 
(Kay et al. 2008; Nishimoto et al. 2011; Schoenmakers et al. 2013), memories (Peth 
et al. 2015), active semantic knowledge (Carlson et al. 2014; Huth et al. 2012, 2016; 
Mitchell et al. 2008), emotions (Huis in ‘t Veld and de Gelder 2015; Plassmann et al. 
2008), political preferences (Lamme 2010), dreams (Horikawa et  al. 2013), pain 
(Cowen et al. 2015; Reardon 2015; Salmanowitz 2015; Wager et al. 2013), and (lev-
els of) consciousness (Blume et al. 2015).
The general approach could be simplified as follows (see also Poldrack and Farah 
2015). A brain monitoring device (e.g. electroencephalography [EEG], functional 
magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]…) is used to collect information about a per-
son’s neural activity that co-occurs with the expression of (a) certain mental state(s). 
Once the data have been recorded, different statistical methods and machine learn-
ing techniques allow one to analyze the collected information and create a represen-
tational map that connects the targeted mental states to the concurrent neural events. 
The mapped associations between the targeted mental states and the neural activ-
ity are learned and generalized to a certain extent. Once this procedure is complete 
and successful, one can apply the trained algorithm to categorize and decode mental 
states on the basis of the observation of the neural activity measurements.
Assessing the Implications of Brain Reading Applications for Mental 
Privacy
Having a clearer idea of what brain reading can and cannot do, it is important to 
form an opinion on whether, when and to what extent it could be applied, both now 
and in the near future. Also, a clearer picture would help determining at what point 
specific concerns may become relevant or urgent. Whether or not a certain tech-
nology might be adopted for certain applications, depends on numerous contingent 
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factors, and drawing a complete model would be beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, we isolate five important factors that might influence brain reading’s prac-
tical adoption, especially in those contexts where mental privacy is at stake: accu-
racy, reliability, informativity, concealability and enforceability. Unlike factors like 
price, availability, hype etc. (on which we will not focus in this paper), these five 
factors are bound to technical and theoretical limits and possibilities. Ideally, they 
are meant to constitute a framework to aid non-experts in asking relevant and mean-
ingful questions. They can potentially assist stakeholders with different backgrounds 
in understanding future advances of brain reading, and in evaluating how realistic 
certain practical applications might be. For policy makers in particular, these five 
principles could aid the production of scientifically informed guidelines.
In order to be considered for adoption in those contexts where possible implica-
tions for mental privacy might occur, brain reading methods must achieve certain 
performance standards. Different contexts of application will have different require-
ments. Evaluating the performance of a certain technology can become a rather 
technical question, and moreover one that can become quickly outdated because 
of ongoing research and development. The notion of performance is well known to 
experts in neuroimaging, and is commonly divided into two components, accuracy 
and reliability. We propose to add a third one, informativity. While accuracy and 
reliability have to do with how well a certain method can read what is meant to be 
read, informativity concerns the relevance the obtainable data has for the practical 
purposes for which the method is meant to be used. Two more criteria, that specifi-
cally make sense in relation to those scenarios where the main preoccupation could 
be the violation of mental privacy and civil rights, are concealability and enforce-
ability. While the former concerns the degree with which a certain brain reading 
method can be concealed from an individual’s perception or awareness, the latter 
regards the extent to which a method can be used against somebody’s will (Table 1).
Accuracy, Reliability, Informativity
Accuracy can be represented as the percentage of times a certain method correctly 
identifies states of mind that are targeted for decoding.6 Here, it is important to con-
sider that in certain cases the specific types of error reducing the accuracy matter a 
great deal. In particular, the relative presence of false positives and false negatives 
can be of great importance in relation to certain contexts of application, e.g. in law. 
Whereas a court might be inclined to risk by admitting a method that can lead to a 
small percentage of false negatives, it might be less willing to base a decision on or 
even just consider a method that is prone to false positives, which could imply con-
victing an innocent person.
The concept of reliability expresses the extent to which the method’s results 
(e.g. identification of a particular trait) remain unaltered over time and across dif-
ferent subjects. Achieving high reliability usually represents a challenge, given the 
6 In brain reading, establishing the correctness of a certain result often implies subjective validation, i.e. 
asking the subject to confirm whether her mental state was really the one the system identified.
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plasticity of individual brains and the large differences that can exist between differ-
ent subjects.
When considering performance in the context of practical applicability, accu-
racy and reliability are not the only important criteria. It is also essential to capture 
and express how relevant the outcomes of a certain technology or method can be 
for a specific application. This question regards the amount and nature of the infor-
mation that can be obtained through brain reading, rather than its correctness. We 
express this with the concept of informativity. Informativity regards the amount of 
produced information relevant for the purposes at hand. Whereas accuracy can be 
expressed quantitatively, informativity is a qualitative measure that depends on the 
question one wants to answer. Factors like number, kind and level of detail with 
which mental states can be identified, are all important in evaluating how informa-
tive, and hence potentially applicable, a certain method can be for a given scope. For 
instance, Huth et al. investigated how the meaning of language is represented in the 
brain. The outcomes of this study suggest that “the contents of thought, or internal 
speech, might be decoded” (Huth et al. 2016). Huth et al. indicate that different cor-
tical areas encode with variable accuracy for semantic mental states belonging to 
12 semantic domains, such as ‘person’, ‘visual’ or ‘time’. Their results constitute a 
remarkable advance in neuroscientific research. However, the degree of abstractness 
and the number of states they were able to discriminate would be a major discussion 
point in considering current practical applicability. Although this method could be 
used to gain some insight in whether a subject is at a certain moment thinking of 
one of the 12 categories (e.g. a person or a car), it is currently unclear whether one 
could be able to determine which car or which person. Those details may indeed be 
represented in the brain by different patterns of activity, but with the current method, 
cutting edge as it is, this cannot be discriminated.
The three aforementioned criteria constitute a coherent set that is worth discuss-
ing in more detail before continuing with the other two criteria. As mentioned at 
the beginning of this section, evaluating the performance is only possible in rela-
tion to a given particular context of application. Different contexts might have dif-
ferent requirements in regard to their level of trustworthiness, type and quantity of 
the provided information. In contexts where the stakes are extremely high, such as 
criminal law, high levels of performance will be required before its results can be 
taken into account. There, the methods applied in brain reading technology, in order 
for its results to be admitted (as regulated by e.g. the Daubert standard (Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92-102), 509 U.S. 579 (1993)) is required to be reli-
able (in our terminology, accurate and reliable) and relevant (our ‘informativity’). 
Moreover, the practical application of brain reading should be generally accepted by 
the scientific community. As of yet, one may have substantial reasons to doubt that 
such is the case.
We want to discuss a practical scenario that considers a brain reading method 
that promises the challenging and societally relevant capacity to identify subjects 
with pedophilia. That particular sexual preference, for its social significance and 
its potential legal consequences, can be, and normally is, concealed by the subjects 
entertaining it. In a recent experiment, Ponseti et al.’s (2012) used fMRI to identify 
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admitting7 pedophiles by detecting states of sexual arousal in brain activity. They 
monitored the subjects’ reactions to the presentation of pictures of potential sexual 
partners of different gender and age. In terms of accuracy, 95% of the subjects were 
correctly classified, and the classification produced no false positives. The perfor-
mance remained solid across the subjects included in the investigation, although the 
reliability over time within a subject has to our knowledge not yet been assessed. 
The relatively high performance may be due to the fact that this particular method, 
rather than identifying the neural correlates of the different sexual preferences, indi-
rectly infers sexual preferences by discriminating a general state of arousal against 
a baseline. It is on the nature of the presented pictures, the evoking stimuli, that 
the inference about a certain sexual preference is drawn. The level of detail and the 
amount of relevant information obtainable in this way is such that some practical 
applications are foreseeable. For instance, it would be a useful tool in therapeutic 
or rehabilitative contexts, e.g. to monitor patients’ or convicts’ response to therapy. 
However, in other contexts, such as e.g. criminal law, this method’s performance 
might still be considered insufficient.
To our knowledge, this brain reading based method to assess pedophilic tenden-
cies has never been proposed in court, but considering the law’s reflection on an 
older technology provides some insights. The one century old penile plethysmogra-
phy (or phallometry) is a technology that aims at detecting states of sexual arousal. 
Rather than directly measuring neural events, it detects variations in penis’ diameter 
or volume. It is known to have average accuracy comparable to that of Ponseti et al’s 
method.8 Yet, phallometry has been previously deemed unacceptable as evidence in 
the American Common Law [see e.g. U.S. v. Powers (United States v. Powers, 59 
F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995), n.d.)].9 The fact that the performance of the two methods 
is similar, both in the nature of the information provided and in the overall accuracy, 
may be taken to suggest that the brain reading based method will not be accepted 
in court as well, based on purely performance based criteria.10 In addition, the two 
methods have been claimed to show different proneness to false positives and false 
negatives. In the discussion of their paper, Ponseti et al. maintain that their method 
7 We will see in a later section why the subjects’ admission is not a detail.
8 The authors claim their method to be “somewhat” better, but the reported accuracy of phallometry var-
ies across different studies.
9 In this case it is important to consider the different proneness to false positives and false negatives. A 
court might be inclined to risk by admitting a method that can lead to a small percentage of false nega-
tives. On the contrary, it might be less eager to base a decision on or even only consider a method that is 
prone to any false positive, which could imply convicting an innocent person.
10 American Common Law has codified criteria for legal admissibility of scientific evidence in general. 
Those guidelines have been produced by the Supreme Court of the United States (Berger 2005) in cases 
like Daubert v. Merrel Dow (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92-102), 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). 
The Supreme Court outlined four criteria to evaluate “scientific validity - and thus the evidentiary rel-
evance and reliability” of a certain technology, theory or method: (a) whether it can be, and has been, 
tested, (b) whether or not it has been peer reviewed and published in scientific journals, (c) the error rate 
(and therefore the reliability) of the methods involved and (d) the degree of general acceptance within 
the relevant scientific community” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92-102), 509 U.S. 579 
(1993)).
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produces no false positives while phallometry produces no false negatives [although 
it must be noticed that the accuracy of phallometric assessments is evaluated differ-
ently in different papers (Ponseti 2012)]. A further detail that has to be considered is 
that Ponseti et al.’s performance is achieved with fully admitting, fully cooperative 
subjects. As we will further discuss in the next section, with individuals that try to 
actively conceal their sexual preference, emotional and physiological reactions, the 
performance would likely decrease to a significant extent (noticeably, this is also the 
case for classic phallometric assessments).
Assessing the accuracy, reliability and informativity of a brain reading method 
in order to decide on the practical usability of its results (e.g. in legal cases) is a 
multi-faceted task that cannot be answered once and for all, but requires highly con-
text specific considerations. We now return to the remaining criteria, concealability 
and enforceability, that didn’t need to be taken into account in the legal scenario we 
analyzed above. However, the possibility to apply brain reading methods without or 
even against somebody’s consent is an important part in understanding and evaluat-
ing their practical applicability in those scenarios where mental privacy and civil 
rights are more at stake.
Concealability and Enforceability in Non‑cooperative Scenarios
The possibility of collecting personal data secretly or against somebody’s will is not 
a novel concern, and it has been discussed since the end of the nineteenth century. 
Warren and Brandeis, as early as 1890, were denouncing how “instantaneous pho-
tographs and newspaper enterprise […] invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten[ed] to make good the pre-
diction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.”” (Warren and Brandeis 1890). In essence, their concern focused on the pos-
sibility that someone’s private matters unwillingly could become public due to new 
technological possibilities. It is worth reflecting on the extent to which brain reading 
could be used unbeknownst to a subject (a criterion that we will call concealability) 
or against somebody’s will (its enforceability). These two aspects are especially rel-
evant when considering potential abuses of the technology and the relative preven-
tive strategies.
Brain reading technology might to a certain extent be used without an individ-
ual being aware of it, or even being aware that any brain measurement is taken at 
all. Different types of scenarios can be devised. In the most innocent, and perhaps 
most currently common one, personal information can be incidentally discovered 
in the course of conducting scientific research or medical interventions with com-
pletely aware and cooperative subjects. Incidental findings fall by definition beyond 
the scope of an intended application. Usually, these findings consist of previously 
undiagnosed neural pathologies, but can in principle be regarded as aspects of one’s 
psychology as well. The extent to which the information obtained is passed to—or 
retained from—the subject is currently regulated in different protocols and ethical 
guidelines of neuroimaging (Bos et  al. 2016; Illes 2006; Shoemaker et  al. 2011). 
Findings need not to be accidental, for a malicious user could intentionally collect 
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data that fall outside the scope of a particular application for which the subject has 
given expressed consent. This does not necessarily apply only to scientific studies 
but could also involve more common scenarios. One example concerns consumer-
grade brain computer interfaces (Ienca et al. 2017). Small and relatively cheap EEG 
devices started circulating among the public at large a few years ago (Emotiv 2017; 
Neurosky 2017), marketed as hands-free controllers for gaming and computer appli-
cations. Similar consumer-grade appliances already have the potential to be utilized 
to collect personal data without the user’s consent and awareness (Martinovic et al. 
2012). For completeness sake, additional scenarios are possible, where ill-inten-
tioned scientists use brain measurements of e.g. unconscious or partially conscious 
subjects without their consent, or use yet to be developed technologies enabling 
brain measurements of awake free moving subjects without being detected. As indi-
cated earlier, we restrict ourselves to more near-future brain reading applications and 
therefore refrain from discussing these more futuristic scenarios.
The above listed scenarios are sorted by their decreasing level of cooperativ-
ity from a subject. While in accidental findings a subject is actively following the 
experimenters’ requests, awake and unknowing subjects behave normally and freely 
engage in a number of daily cognitive tasks. It is important to notice that the less a 
subject is actively cooperating in performing a certain mental task, the harder it gen-
erally becomes to collect meaningful data. Non-cooperation would be likely to lead 
to a significant decrease in performance, due to the general difficulty of discriminat-
ing neural process in a subject that is not actively focusing on a single task.
A further step towards non-cooperation involves cases where subjects are well 
aware that a reading is happening, but actively try to defy the technology. Enforcing 
brain reading is not easy, as brain reading methods, and particularly those that are 
based on functional assessments (e.g. fMRI), are prone to different kinds of inten-
tional disruption. The simplest way one could render results of a functional imaging 
method invalid would be by generating noise. Noise can be generated for instance by 
simple muscular movements. A sufficient level of noise would likely make the entire 
dataset unusable. Normally, this form of ‘sabotage’ is relatively easy to discover, 
when one participants’ dataset contains significantly more noise than the datasets of 
other participants (unless all the subjects aim to sabotage the brain reading process). 
One could also deliberately refrain from producing the investigated brain signals, by 
not performing the cognitive task accurately, or only some of the time, or by focus-
ing on other cognitive tasks, engaging in mind wandering, etc. Even simple shifts in 
attention have been shown to warp the way mental states are represented in the brain 
(Çukur et al. 2013). Here, discovering the lack of cooperation may still be possible, 
but more difficult than in the case of deliberate noise production.11 Brain reading 
procedures can not only be sabotaged by a subject that is forced to undergo it. It is 
during research and development that a technology becomes particularly vulnerable 
11 Similar concerns were valid already for classic techniques like polygraphic and psychological assess-
ments. A subject, willing to deceive those methods, could learn how to control her physiological reac-
tions (i.e. try to present a different signal), create confounds in the data by producing noise, or, in the 
case of questionnaires, to intentionally distort the outcome (Van Geert et al. 2016).
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to being misled or ‘boycotted’. The data collection phase is particularly sensitive 
in that regard: one or more research subjects might declare full cooperation while 
covertly devising the process by deploying one of the mentioned sabotage strategies. 
This could be due for instance to privacy concerns and result from some kind of 
political activism.12 At this particular stage, for many mental states there is no other 
way to know which ones are entertained by a subject but to ask for subjective reports 
and assume complete cooperation. When one is to map mental states to neural activ-
ity, any uncertainty about the former drastically reduces the chances of success. 
At the research stage, the performance of the method itself is assessed, and hence 
depends on, the cooperation and bona fide of the experimental subjects. The process 
can be boycotted at different stages of the research phase itself, as any method com-
monly undergoes a number of validations and tests, all based on subjective reports.
As mentioned while discussing Ponseti et  al. and their study on sexual prefer-
ences, research professionals are well aware of the issues regarding different non-
cooperative scenarios. Further research is needed to assess the extent to which the 
performance of brain reading methods can be preserved as subjects actively try to 
defy them. Advances in neuroscience and technology might partially address those 
technical limitations. Neuroimaging research is for instance increasingly recognizing 
the value of methods aimed at decoding mental states under more natural, ecologi-
cal conditions (Nishimoto et al. 2011; Stansbury et al. 2013). Though it is hard to 
estimate any timeframe, this suggests that future technology might be increasingly 
resilient to all sorts of disruptions that typically affect non-cooperative scenarios.
Non-cooperative scenarios can be considered with respect to the technical vul-
nerabilities involved, but they should also be analyzed with respect to their ethical 
and societal relevance. For instance, whether or not one should use such technol-
ogy, if available, in what contexts, and to what extent, is object of intense discus-
sion. In certain cases checking the reliability of testimonies through neurotech-
nology may be argued to be justifiably enforced for ‘the common good’ (Vedder 
and Klaming 2010). Contrary to the ‘for the common good’ reasoning, it has been 
argued that such scenarios could imply a violation of constitutional rights in cer-
tain legal systems (Pardo and Patterson 2013, ch. 6). For instance, they might con-
stitute an infringement of the 4th and/or 5th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
that protect respectively against unreasonable searches and seizures and against 
self-incrimination.
Conclusions
Brain reading technology represents a contemporary approach to mind reading. 
In principle, it grants the ability to read concealed mental states, possibly without 
a subject’s awareness or even cooperation. It would be important for a number 
of different stakeholders to be able to estimate the extent to which these possi-
bilities are realistic, and the timeframe before they eventually become so. That 
12 Daniel C. Dennett suggested such a scenario in a private conversation (Padua, May 2016).
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is something which cannot be done once and for all. Rather, it takes consistent 
and competent monitoring of any and every relevant scientific and technological 
advancement. In order to be up to the task, ethicists, journalists and policy mak-
ers must be equipped with and agree upon reliable information and the appropri-
ate conceptual tools. A meaningful and well-informed debate would contribute to 
prevent unnecessary concern among the public at large and allow the numerous 
interested stakeholders to timely and measuredly react to scientific and techno-
logical advances. It would also benefit neuroscientific research, as a more accu-
rate understanding of the state of the art would contribute to maximize the confi-
dence of institutions towards it.
Discussing the implications of a technology that is still in its infancy, runs the 
risk of being criticized as engaging in a premature discussion, or worse, even sug-
gesting a technology is capable of more than current research warrants. Most of 
the ethically challenging scenarios that we envisage are currently only possible in 
principle, and ignore the technical limitations. Abstracting from current technology 
and technical limitation, according to this argument, might make our discussion less 
compelling and too speculative. Worse, it might fuel media hypes by either being 
too optimistic, creating unrealistic expectations, or, by being too pessimistic, gener-
ate unnecessary worries. We acknowledge such risks. At the same time, it would be 
unwise to wait with the assessment and discussion of potential implications of brain 
reading till the technology would be full-fledged. One shouldn’t delay the ethical 
discussion until it is too late (van de Poel and Royakkers 2011, p. 130). Societal 
debates take time too, and all too often technological (and economic) developments 
run ahead of proper societal evaluations to such an extent that it becomes extremely 
hard to correct them (consider e.g. the implications of internet tracking for privacy). 
Therefore, we suggest, one has no other option then to discuss the implications of 
technology under development, and it is important to do this as realistically as pos-
sible. It is for this reason that we suggest our evaluative criteria as ways of avoiding 
overly positive or excessively negative assessments of brain reading. Furthermore, 
our work might assist in identifying which research directions society would be (un)
favorably disposed to.
We provided an overview of five aspects that we believe are among the most 
important ones to influence the practical applicability of a brain reading technology 
in practical scenarios, especially where mental privacy and civil rights are a con-
cern. These aspects—accuracy, reliability, informativity, concealability and enforce-
ability—could be used as criteria to produce an estimate of whether, when and to 
what situations brain reading technology could be applicable. Those criteria depend 
in turn on numerous ethical, legal and technical factors. Our discussion is aimed 
to identify several basic coordinates through which stakeholders can orient them-
selves within this rapidly growing field of brain reading. Numerous areas, such as 
healthcare, education and law, to name but a few, could benefit or suffer from brain 
reading technology’s novel possibilities. If this is the case for the present time, in the 
near future these possibilities are set to become even more compelling. We hope to 
promote general awareness of the basic concepts, criteria, methodology and applica-
tions of brain reading, and thereby facilitate a systematic discussion about its ethi-
cal, legal and societal implications.
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